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Attorney's Fees
(continued from page 103)

district court to determine the appropriate compensation.
Trial and Appellate Opinions
The trial court found that the
percentage fees were reasonable. It
granted Patterson's request for attorney's fees but reduced his corepresentative earnings. The court
also awarded NCNB's sum as corporate representative, but denied
NCNB's compensation request for
extraordinary services.
The Daughters appealed to the
Fourth District Court of Appeals
and argued that the trial court had
incorrectly applied the statute governing probate fees. They contended
that section 733.617, Florida Statutes (1987), detailed several factors
to consider in order to set these type
of fees, one of which was the
amount of time and effort involved
in representing the client. The
Daughters further argued that nothing in the provisions of section
733.617 prevented the application
of an hourly rate to help assess a
reasonable fee. The appellate court,
however, upheld the trial court's
assignment of fees based on the
value of the decedent's estate. The
Daughters appealed to the Florida
Supreme Court.
Reasonable Fee is Correct

Standard
The Supreme Court of Florida
examined the legislative history of
section 733.617 to ascertain
whether a sliding percentage scale
was the appropriate method for
calculating compensation. The section's predecessor statute expressly
provided for a sliding percentage
fee scale based on the size of the
estate handled by the attorney.
However, in 1974 this section was
replaced, and attorneys and other
professionals were to receive reasonable compensation for their services, rather than a percentage of
the estate. The factors later added
to assist a trial judge in determining reasonable fees included,
among others, consideration of: (1)
the time and labor involved in the
case and the skills needed to provide the service; (2) the restrictions
placed on other employment while
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providing the service; (3) the fees
customarily charged in the community for comparable service; (4)
the nature and duration of the
relationship between the professional and the decedent; and (5)
the amount of time and effort
involved and the results obtained.
The Florida Legislature instructed
that one or more of these factors
should be used to determine reasonable compensation.
Consequently, the Florida Supreme Court found that legislative
intent dictated that a reasonable
fee, not a percentage rate, should
be the standard used to determine
compensation. The court recognized that since section 733.617
applied to various professionals
employed to handle an estate, all
provisions would not apply to all
professional categories. However,
all factors which applied to a specific category of professionals
should be consistently applied
within that profession so that a
reasonable fee in one case would be
consistent with others fees in similar cases. Thus, the court reasoned
that the value of an estate should
not be the controlling factor, but
one of several elements for attorneys to consider when determining
fees.
Goal is Consistent Results
The court explicitly rejected an
argument proposed by the Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law
Section of the Florida Bar, which
presented a supplemental brief in
support of Patterson. The court
disagreed that the "one or more of
the following" language in the statute permitted a judge to find attorney's fees based on the value of the
estate alone or in combination
with any of the other factors listed
under section 733.617. The Florida Supreme Court stated that allowing such random assessments
among judges would leave the public without consistent results in
probate cases.
Hourly Rate Part of Determination

Lastly, the court held that the
hourly rate approach should be
employed to help ascertain a reasonable attorney's fee because this
method mirrored the approach to
fee assessment taken in section

733.617. In this case, however, the
trial court's records were unclear as
to which of the services provided
by Patterson's staff should be categorized as attorney's fees and
which should be considered additional fees. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court remanded the case
back to the trial court for conclusive determinations.
Clarinda Gipson

California Holds Ski Lift
Operators to Higher
Standard of Care in Tort
Cases
In Squaw Valley Ski Corporation
v. Superior Court of Placer County,
3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992), the California Court of Appeals for the Third District held
that ski lift operators are common
carriers and therefore are held to a
higher standard of care for the
purpose of determining liability in
tort cases.
Background
Squaw Valley Ski Corporation
("Squaw Valley") operates skiing
facilities in California. In order to
use Squaw Valley ski lifts, patrons
must have skis, bindings, boots,
and valid lift passes. Patricia
Bowles ("Bowles"), having complied with these requirements, approached one of Squaw Valley's
chair lifts in April of 1986. As she
attempted to board, a chair struck
Bowles in the head causing injuries.
Bowles sued Squaw Valley in the
Superior Court of Placer County,
California, asserting that the company negligently operated the ski
lift because no employees were
present to help patrons board. Prior to trial, Bowles asked the court
to establish that Squaw Valley was
a common carrier for the purpose
of determining tort liability.
The basic standard of care in
negligence cases is ordinary care,
the measures a reasonable, prudent
person would use under the circumstances. A common carrier, on
the other hand, is held to a higher
standard of care because a California liability statute imposes a duty
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on common carriers to exercise the
utmost care and diligence toward
patrons. However, common carriers do not act as insurers of their
passengers' safety and must only
exercise care consistent with the
practical operation of the carrier's
business.
Squaw Valley asserted four reasons why it was not responsible for
the heightened level of care. First,
Squaw Valley argued that it was
not a common carrier under the
state liability statute. Second, even
if Squaw Valley was a common
carrier, a California utilities statute exempted it from common
carrier status. This statute exempted ski lift operators from the definition of a common carrier for
regulation by the California Public
Utilities Commission. Third,
Squaw Valley asserted that it was
not liable because the carrier-passenger relationship had not commenced at the time of the accident.
Finally, Squaw Valley argued that
public policy dictates that chair lift
operators be exempt from common carrier status.
The trial court held that Squaw
Valley was a common carrier and
that the state utilities statute exempted ski lift operators from
common carrier status for public
utilities regulation purposes only.
Squaw Valley appealed this ruling
to the California Court of Appeals
for the Third District.
Common Carrier Status Applies
The California liability statute,
Civil Code section 2168, defines a
common carrier as any entity that
holds itself out to the public as
transporting goods or persons from
place to place for profit. The appellate court reasoned that Squaw
Valley fit this definition because it
offered the ski lift facilities to the
public for a fixed charge.
Squaw Valley, however, argued
that it did not offer its lift facilities
to the general public because use of
the lift was restricted to persons
who used the proper equipment
and who purported to have the
ability to ski. The court rejected
this argument, stating that an offering to the public does not mean an
offering to everyone at all times; an
enterprise need only be available to
the extent that members of the
Volume 4 Number 3/Spring, 1992

general public may use it if they
choose to. The Squaw Valley requirements were merely conditions required by the sport of skiing. Any person complying with
the necessities of the sport could
avail themselves of the service,
therefore, the court ruled that
Squaw Valley offered its facilities
to the public.

tance. Bowles paid for her lift
ticket and was attempting to board
the chair lift at the boarding area at
the time of injury. The court ruled
that the carrier-passenger relationship had commenced and therefore
held that the common carrier status applied to Squaw Valley.

No Exemption From Common
Carrier Status

Finally, Squaw Valley claimed
that public policy demands ski lift
facilities be exempted from common carriers status for tort liability
purposes. Boarding a moving ski
lift, Squaw Valley asserted, involves inherent risks that cannot
be eliminated. Ski lifts, therefore,
differ significantly from typical
common carriers such as taxicabs
or buses and holding ski lift operators to a higher standard of care
was impractical. The court, however, refused to consider the public
policy argument, holding that the
legislature, not the court, was the
proper forum for these considerations.
Scott R. Anderson

Squaw Valley argued that because ski lift operators are exempted from common carrier status
under the California utilities statute, they are also exempted from
common carrier status for purposes of tort liability. The appellate
court rejected this argument, stating that the legislature not only
enacted the utilities and liabilities
laws as part of distinctly different
statutory schemes but also for different purposes.
Prior to enactment of the utilities statute, the California Public
Utilities Commission rendered an
administrative opinion that ski lift
facilities were not common carriers
subject to its regulatory jurisdiction. The court found that the
legislature's purpose in enacting
the utilities statute was merely to
codify this decision and not to
further exempt ski lift operators
from common carrier status for
tort liability. If the legislature intended the further exemption it
would have directly amended or
referred to the liability statute.
Therefore, the court held that the
California utilities statute did not
exempt Squaw Valley from common carrier status for determining
tort liability.
Carrier-Passenger Relationship
Had Begun
Squaw Valley further argued
that common carrier status did not
apply because Bowles had not actually boarded the ski lift at the time
of the accident, and therefore, the
carrier-passenger relationship had
not yet commenced. The court
disagreed, stating that the carrierpassenger relationship commences
when a person goes to the place of
departure intending in good faith
to become a passenger and the
carrier takes some action in accep-

Public Policy Argument Fails

Texas Court of Appeals
Denies Summary
Judgment Due To
Temporary Suspension
of Statute of Limitations
In Misbranded Drug
Case
In Parker v. Yen and Revco Discount Drug Centers, Inc., 823 S.W.
2d 359 (Tex. App. Dallas 1991),
the Texas Court of Appeals for the
Fifth District held that summary
judgement could not be granted in
a case involving medical malpractice, negligence, and the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act while there
were genuine issues of fact as to the
statute of limitations and proximate cause.
Background
Charles A. Parker ("Parker")
sued on behalf of himself and Mrs.
Rosalie C. Parker, alleging that
Garry Robert Yen ("Yen"), a pharmacist employed by Revco Discount Drug Centers, Inc. ("Revco"), misfilled a prescription for
(continued on page 106)
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